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directors. He recognised the existence of the corporation, and
is estopped from denying it ; but he did not recognise those per-
sons as directors, and the acts of other persons, without his con-
sent, cannot bind him.
If I promise to pay money upon the demand of A., I deny
that I am bound to pay it upon the demand of B., who falsely
claims to be the attorney of A., although B. may have acted as
such attorney defacto in a great many instances, and may have
been recognised as such attorney by a great many very respect-
able people.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.'
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.2
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.'
BILLS AND NOTES.
Tndorser not notified-Offer to pay or to compromise.-An indorser
who had not been legally notified of the dishonor of the paper, made to
the assignees of the bank owning it, an offer to pay the amount in the
bills of the bank, which were then largely depreciated. The assignees
refused to receive this payment. field, that this was to be regarded as
an offer to compromise only, and not such an offer to pay as could be
construed into a waiver of notice: Newberry vs. Trowbridge, IS Mich.
CHECK.
Thlen an Assignment-Desatio causa mortis.-Tbe holder of a check
cannot usually have any claim against the drawers, unless it is accepted.
And if it can operate in any case as an assignment of the fund it must
be irrevocable, and upon sufficient consideration. A check drawn by a
person in extremis, designed to operate in lieu of a testamentary instru-
ment, and not paid by the drawer, gave no right of action against the
drawer, and could not operate to assign the fund, being revocable and
made without consideration. A check of this kind is not valid as a
donatio causa mortis, and becomes void at the drawer's death: Second
.National Bank vs. Williams, 13 Mich.
From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 2 of his Reports
2 From Joel Tiffany, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 1 of his Reports.
3 From W. G Veazey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 36 Vermont Reports.
4 From Hon. T. M. Cooley, Reporter; to appear in 13 Michigan Reports.
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CORPORATION.
Stockholder may be permitted in Equity to become a party defendant
for special purposes.-Stockholders of a corporation, who have been
allowed to put in answers in the name of a corporation, cannot be re-
garded as answering for the corporation itself In a special case, how-
ever, where there is an allegation that the directors fraudulently refused
to attend to the interests of the corporation, a court of equity will, in its
discretion, allow a stockholder to become a party defendant, for the pur-
pose of protecting-from unfounded and illegal claims against the com-
pany-his own interest and the interest of such other stockholders as
choose to join him in the defence: Bronson et al. vs. La Crosse and
Milwaukie Railroad Company et al., 2 Wall.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The Legal Tender Act.-Congress had full power to pass the act
making treasury notes a legal tender in the payment of private debts:
Van HusaM vs. Kanouse, 13 Mich.
The Stamp At.-A person in extremis, being the holder of a thirty-
day draft on a banker, which was not sufficiently stamped, made a gift
of 'it to her mother in August 1863. After the donor's death her
administrator, treating the draft (which had not been paid), as void,
brought suit against the drawer for the original consideration. The
drawer defended in the interest of the donee. On the trial, after the
Act of Congress of June 30th 1864 took effect, the draft was produced,
and stamps to a sufficient amount placed upon it and cancelled. It was
held, that the draft was thereby made valid under said Act of 'Congress,
and that its validity related to the time when it was drawn, and that con-
sequently plaintiff could not recover: Gibson vs. Hibbard, 13 Mich.
Limitation Laws-Statute, when to take efect.-The legislature has
full control over the subject of limitation laws, subject only to the prin-
ciple that a reasonable time must be allowed in which to bring suite.
As to what is a reasonable time that is to be determined by the legislative
judgment, and the courts are not at liberty to review its action: Price
vs. .opkin, 13 Mich.
A legislative act, however, which should be retrospective in its opera-
tion, and which should cut off all remedy for the lapse of time which
had occurred before its passage, would not be a limitation act, but would
be unconstitutional, because depriving persons of their rights without
due process of law: Id.
A statute passed to take effect at a future day, is to be understood as
speaking from the time it goes into operation, and not from the time of
its passage. The intervening time is allowed to enable the public to
become acquainted with its provisions, and they are not ompelled during
that period to govern their actions by its provisions: Id.
Act No. 227 of 1863 (Laws of 1863, p. 388), amending the limitation
law relating to real property, as embodied in the compiled laws, was
passed March 1st 1863, to take effect January 1st 1864. No force or
effect can be given to the law before the time when it was ordered by
the legislature to go into operation, and it cannot constitutionally be
applied to any case where its effect would be to cut off an existing right
of action the moment it came into force: Id.
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Where, therefore, by the law as it stood December 31st 1863, a person
was allowed 15 years in which to bring suit for the recovery of a parcel
of land claimed by her, and said Act of 1863, if applied to the case,
would have the effect to prohibit at once any suit for its recovery, it was
held, that the act could not constitutionally apply to the case: id.
Limitation of Actions-Power of Legislature to makce a Tax Deed
conclusive.-The statute declaring that fands bid off by the state, and
not disposed of for five years, shall vest in the state an absolute title, in
fee simple, is not a statute of limitations, and is void, as taking private
property without due process of law. (L. 1858, p. 192, sec. 135):
Groesbeck vs. Seeley, 13 Mich.
Limitation laws always must operate to compel a party to enforce or
prosecute his cause of action within some reasonable time. But a party
who is in the enjoyment of his rights, cannot be compelled to take
measures against an adverse claimant, and a law taking away the rights
of a party in such a case is an unlawful confiscation, and in no sense a
limitation law: Rd.
An auditor's deed of state tax lands purchased at his office, is prima
facie evidence of regularity and legality, but not conclusive; and irregu-
larity may be shown to impeach the tax-title: Id.
DEED.
Acknowledgment before Party in interest- Consideration-Stamp.-
A grantee, or one for whose immediate use a grant is made, cannot take
the acknowledgment thereof. But where no such interest appears on
the face of the deed, no trust results to the party from whom the con-
sideration passed, and who procured the deed to be made, and he can
have no rights, unless by virtue of some instrument valid under the
Statute of Frauds: Groesbeck vs. Seeley, 13 Mich.
Evidence is admissible to prove that no consideration passed between
the parties to a deed, and that it was procured by, and intended to
operate in favor of another, as such evidence furnishes a reason for de-
termining the amount of stamps requisite by the value of the interest
conveyed, instead of by the consideration: Id.
EQUiTY.
Trusts-Enforcement of resulting Trust by Creditors.-The enforce-
ment of pure trusts is one of the original and inherent powers of a court
of equity, and, by force of the state constitution, this power is now vested
in the Supreme Court: Mc(artney vs. Bostwick, 1 Tiffany.
The jurisdiction of the court in respect to creditors' bills, is auxiliary
to the remedies of the creditor at law, and can only be invoked after
performance of the statutory condition that the remedies at law shall
first be exhausted: Id.
In cases of pure trust, the party ordinarily has no remedy at law, and
may resort in the first instance to a court of equity: 1d.
Previous to the revision of our statutes, when land was purchased in
the name of one, with the money of another, save in a few exceptional
cases, the law declared a resulting trust in favor of the party paying the
consideration : Id.
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By the statute of uses and trusts, this rule was abolished, a-d an
independent resulting trust was declared in favor of creditors, which
iay be enforced in the first instance in a court of equity, where nothing
has been done or omitted by the creditors, tending to impair their rights,
and where the design and effect of the transaction has been to defraud
them of their remedies at law: Id.
ESTOPPEL.
In pais.-Where the husband of a woman sold a horse belonging to
her witheut authority, and she was informed of the sale before payment
had been made, and had a convenient opportunity to inform the pur-
chaser of her rights, but neglected to do so until after he had made pay-
ment to the husband, it was held, that she was estopped from thereafter
asserting title to the horse against a mortgagee of the purchaser: Danx
vs. Cudney, 13 Mich.
EVIDENCE.
Plans.-In the trial of actions involving title to lands, which involve
an inquiry in reference to lines, with the usual accompaniment of marked
trees and monuments, it is held, that a plan showing the relative position
of the various lines, objects, &c., upon which the party relied, and
verified by the person making it as correctly made, though not sub-
stantive- independent evidence of itself, may yet be allowed to be
exhibited to the jury, and used in evidence in connection with the evi-
dence of the person miking it, and all the evidence in the case relative
to the various objects shown upon it, and may be taken by the jury when
they retire to make their verdict: Wood el aL vs. Willard et aL., 36 Vt.
Where the controversy between the parties in a suit is in respect to
the location of the division line between their lands, and not in respect
to the character and extent of the possession of their predecessors in
title, they are not at liberty to prove the declarations of their respective
grantors, made at the time of the purchase, as to where the true line
was: Id.
ExEcuIOr.
Statutory Notice to Executor.-Under a statute which authorizes
execution to issue against the lands of a deceased debtor, provided that
the plaintiff in the execution shall give notice to the executor or admin-
istrator, if there be any, of the decedent,-a sale without either such
notice or scire facias, as at the common law (or proof that there were
no executors ?), is void. On a question of title, under this statute, the
burden of proving that his purchase was after due notice, rests with the
purchaser; the record of execution and sale not of themselves raising a
presumption that notice was given: Ransom vs. Williams, 2 Wall.
Defective Levy.-Where a town clerk's certificate and an officer's
return disagree as to the time when a levy of execution was recorded in
the town clerk's office, the certificate of the clerk will prevail: Ellisolb
vs. Wilson, 36 Vt.
If an execution is actually levied on the land attached on mesne pro-
cess, and the appraisal made within five calendar months after the rendi-
tion of final judgment, but the levy is not recorded in the town clerk's
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
office until after the five months have expired, the levy will not be in
season to connect it with the attachment lien: Id.
There is no analogy between an unrecorded conveyance and a defective
levy. A deed passes the title between the parties, and recording is only
necessary to give notice of it to the world; while a levy, so long as it
lacks any of the statute requisites, is wholly insufficient to affect the
title even as between the parties: Id.
JURY.
Challenge to Juror: what sufficient cause.-A person summoned as a
juror in a criminal case was challenged for cause, and asked by counsel
for defendant if he had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant, and replied: "I have formed a partial opinion from
rumors in the street, but not a positive opinion." No further inquiries
were made, and it was held, that the challenge was not sustained: Beople
vs. Bolt, 13 Mich.
LIMITATION.
Adverse Possession.-The defendant not having performed a contract
for the purchase of land so as to be legally entitled to a con-eyance, if
he did in fact set up a claim of title in himself, it could not affect the
plaintiff until distinct knowledge of such adverse claim was brought
home to him: Robinson, Adm'r, vs. Sherwin, Ex'r., 36 Vt.
OFFICE.
Appointment to Office, when a removal of Icumbent.-The Common
Council of Detroit, having power to fill an office, the term of which
was fixed by statute at two years, and having also the right to remove
the incumbent at pleasure, made an appointment for one year only, and
at the end of that period made a new appointment without, in terms,
removing the incumbent. Bield, that the restriction of the first appoint-
ment to one year was void, and that the appointee was entitled to hold
for the full term : that he could not be removed without an intent to
remove him: that the circumstances did not show such intent, but
showed only that a new appointment was made because the Councils
supposed the force of the original one was spent; and that consequently
the first appointee continued the lawful incumbent: Stadler vs. Detroit
City, 13 Mich.
PARTNERSHIP.
contract against 2Iublic policy- Operations completed-Ref usal oJ
Partner to Account-Fidticitir relations between Partners.-After a
partnership contract confessedly against public policy has been carried
out, and money contributed by one of the partners has passed into other
forms,-the restlts of the contemplated operation completed,-a partner,
in whose hands the profits are, cannot refuse to account for and divide
them on the ground of the illegal character of the original contract:
Brooks vs. .tlartin, 2 Wall.
Where one partner, who is in sound health, is made sole agent of the
partnership by another, who is not, and who relies on him wholly for
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true accounts, and the party thus made agent manages the business at a
distance from the other, communicating to him no information, the rela-
tion of partners, whatever it may be in general, becomes fiduciary, and
the law governing such relations applies: Id.
PATENT.
Claim for "any mode of combining" certain devices not good.-A
claim for a combination of several devices, so combined together as to
produce a particular result, is not good as a claim for "any mode of
combining those devices which would produce that result," and can only
be sustained as a valid claim for the peculiar combination of devices
invented and described. Burr vs. Dui:yee, 1 Wall. 553, affirmed and
applied: Case vs. Brown, 2 Wall.
PHYSICIAN.
Medical Ethics-Admission to corporate franchises-Mandamus.-
Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel a county medical society
to admit an applicant entitled to membership: The People ex rel. Bartlett
vs.'The Medical Society of the County of Erie, 1 Tiffany.
A licensed physician, having the prescribed qualifications, cannot be
excluded from the franchise on the ground that he did not conform to
the conventional rules of the society at a period antecedent to his appli-
cation : 1d.
The code of medical ethics, adopted by the by-laws of a county society,
is obligatory on members alone, and its non-observance, previous to
membership, furnishes no legal cause either for exclusion or expulsion:
Id.
When a party, having a clear presumptive title, claims admission to
the exercise of a corporate franchise, the right of immediate expulsion
should be clear and unquestioned to justify the rejection of the claim:
Id.
The general policy of the law is opposed to sharp and summary judg-
ment, where the party whose rights are involved has no opportunity to
be heard: id.
PRACTICE.
Trial - Control of the Court over disparaging questions asked of a
Witness.-The court in which a 6ause is tried, in the exercise of its dis-
cretion, may exclude disparaging questions not relevant to the issue, on
the cross-examination of a witness. though put for the avowed purpose
of impairing his general credit; and this may be done on the objection
of the party, without putting the witness to his claim of privilege: Great
Western Turnpike Co. vs. Loomis, 1 Ti:#any.
In the exercise of this discretion, such questions should be allowed,
when there is reason to believe it may tend to promote the ends of jus-
tice; but they may properly be excluded, when a disparaging course of
examination seems unjust to the witness, and uncalled for by the circum-
stances of the particular case : .d.
On questions of this nature, the decision of the original tribunal is
not subject to review, unless in cases of manifest abuse or injustice : JR.
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REBELLION.
Status of loyal Southerners obliged to remain among the Rebels, and
of their Property on the re-establishment of Peace- Cotton considered as
a subject for capture, though private Property-J trisdiction of the
Federal Courts, sitting in Admiralty, over captures on Lond.-The
principle, that personal dispositions of the individual inhabitants of
enemy territory as distinguished from those of the enemy people gene-
rally, cannot, in questions of capture, be inquired into, applies in civil
wars as in international. Hence, all the people of any district that was
in insurrection against the United States in the Southern rebellion, are
to be regarded as enemies, except in so far as by action of the govern.
ment itself that relation may have been changed: Airs. Alexander's
Cotton, 2 Wall.
Our government, by its Act of Congress of March 12th 1863 (12
Stat. at Large 591), to provide for the collection of abandoned property,
&c., does made distinction between those whom the rule of international
law would class as enemies; and, through forms which it prescribes,
protects the tights of property of all persons in rebel regions who, during
the rebellion, have, in fact, maintained a loyal adhesion to the govern-
ment; the general policy of our legislation during the rebellion having
been to preserve, for loyal owners obliged by circumstances to remain in
rebel states, all property or its proceeds which has come to the possession
of the government or its officers: Id.
Cotton in the Southern rebel districts-constituting as it did the chief
reliance of the rebels for means to purchase munitions of war, an element
of strength to the rebellion-was a proper subject of capture by the
government during the rebellion on general principles of public law
relating to War, though private property; and the legislation of Congress
during the rebellion authorized such captures . Id.
Property captured on land by the officers and crews of a naval force
of the United States, is not "maritime prize ;" even though, like cotton,
it may have been a proper subject of capture generally, as an element
of strength to the enemy. Under the Act of Congress of March 12th
1863, such property captured during the rebellion should be turned over
to the treasury department, by it to be sold, and the proceeds deposited
in the national treasury, so that any person asserting ownership of it may
prefer his claim in the Court of Claims under the said act; and on
making proof to the satisfaction of that tribunal that he has never given
aid or comfort to the rebellion, have a return of the net procceds decreed
to him: Id.
TENDER.
Lien of Mortgage discharged thereby/.-Where the mortgagor of lands,
after the mortgage falls due but before foreclosure, tenders.to the bolder
the full amount due, which the latter refusea to receive, the lien of the
mortgage is discharged thereby: Van Husan vs. Kanouse, 13 Mich.
